Guest Post: Alex Cahill on Debt Ceiling Negotiations

Editor's Note: In this afternoon's post, Alex Cahill, friend of the bloggers, puts his certification in negotiation in good purpose in an interesting discussion of the negotiation options had by Democrats in light of what appears to be significant Republican intransigence. We extend our thanks for his expertise. -- A.S.

With the ongoing political strife between Democrats and Republicans over raising the debt ceiling, the art of negotiation is on full display. Negotiations have been ongoing for months with Vice President Biden leading a bipartisan group of congressional officials in an attempt to craft a long term debt reduction package coupled with raising the debt ceiling. However, negotiations remain stalled and with Republicans walking away from two debt reduction meetings (i.e. Eric Cantor walking out of VP Biden’s sessions and Speaker Boehner apparently unwilling to agree to a $4 trillion debt reduction deal), the question emerges as to how Democrats can negotiate with a party who may not be interested in negotiating in good faith?

The Harvard Negotiation Project took up this vexing question and produced the book “Getting To Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In,” that provides the “textbook” response for negotiating in difficult situations. First, the book notes that it is important to “separate the people from the problem.” Emotions and egos can become a major stumbling block during negotiations, which adversely affects a negotiators ability understand the other party's underlying interests. This results in adversarial rather than cooperative interactions. This step involves:

• Clarifying perceptions
• Recognizing and legitimizing emotions
• Communicating clearly

Second, it is important for political leaders to separate “positions” from “interests.” Interests can be satisfied through a range of solutions where positions only allow one party to succeed. In the current debate, Republicans have taken the “position” of no new taxes, with an underlying interest of not officially raising tax rates while being semi-amenable to closing tax loopholes and eliminating subsidies. As negotiations continue, it will be important for both sides to ask clarifying and empowering questions of the other to clarify interests in order to reach a solution.

Third, when faced with a party that acts in bad faith, a negotiator should insist that each party use objective criteria to evaluate potential solutions. For instance, both parties acceptance of Congressional Budget Office “scores” (budget analysis) of potential budget deals would mandate that fair standards and procedures be used during the negotiation process. By using fair standards and procedures, principled negotiation is encouraged, thereby encouraging dialogue between the parties and allowing the party acting in good faith to pressure the other side to accept an agreement.

Now, you might say that using objective criteria is great, but what happens if the other party uses “dirty tricks” such as lies, pressure tactics, or continues to act in bad faith? Usually, unskilled negotiators facing these “dirty tricks” will either attempt to appease the party acting in bad faith or conduct reciprocal dirty tricks. Either act results in a less than ideal negotiating outcome. Instead, when confronted with the “dirty tricks,” negotiators should utilize a three pronged approach:

1. Recognize the trick being played (From the Democratic perspective—Republicans desire to allegedly tackle the debt issue, but their continued refusal to agree to a meaningful compromise. And from the Republicans perspective—President Obama’s desire to reduce the national debt, but his political party’s unwillingness to restructure Entitlement Programs)
2. Draw attention to the trick being played (seen through numerous press conferences by both Republicans and Democrats)
3. Negotiate about the negotiation itself (i.e. about the rules with which the negotiation will be conducted. This can be seen in regards to whether President Obama is negotiating with the desire to reach a $4, 2 or 1 trillion debt reduction agreement—the desired number determines the issues discussed and the process of the negotiations.)

Lastly, I want to mention one other possibility rarely mentioned in news commentary or analysis; namely, that the current ongoing dispute regarding the nation’s debt truly epitomizes a “worldview conflict” about the proper role and size of government. Worldview conflict involves our most deeply rooted values and often emerges through the words religion, politics and personal identity. For many Democrats, the issue of raising taxes on those with great wealth is a matter of not simply debt reduction, but a fundamental act of social justice. Similarly, for many Republicans, debt reduction and balanced budgets serves as the premier value that forms their political identity. While arguments are easily made about the hypocrisy of many political leaders positions regarding these fundamental values (i.e. how can Republicans value balanced budgets but vote for two unfunded wars, or conversely, how can Democrats support tax increases, yet fail to rein in Wall Street’s flagrant excesses through Dodd-Frank?) What is important to recognize is not the hypocrisy prevalent among political leaders, but instead the deep seated values inherent in this debate and perhaps the scary reality that our political fissures may not be solved through a quick compromise, but rather will ultimately require a new political culture based on recognition and acceptance.

Stay tuned for Alex’s post-mortem of the outcomes in the debt ceiling ‘negotiations’ – just as soon as they’ve concluded, that is.

A Clerihew and Two Limericks

Iceni queen Boudica
Was more than just a rude hick. A
General named Suetonius
Defeated her in a manner most unceremonious.

An effeminate postman named Kurtz
Prefers walking 'round town wearing skirts
He just likes the sensation
Of good ventilation
While walking (or so he asserts).

There once was a man from Dundee
Who wrote bawdy poems for a fee
A duplicitous priest
Bought two hundred, at least
And was fired by Papal decree.

Same-Sex Marriage and Use Theories of Meaning

Lots of snarky (but, I concede, smart) Catholics and natural law types regard same-sex marriage as a sort of oxymoron. For them, as for many of us, "marriage" is a term the successful application of which requires that several necessary conditions be met. The sort of people who regards same-sex marriage as oxymoronic, though, will hold that the conditions necessary for applying the term include at least these two:

1. The term describes a union between two and not more than two human parties.
2. The parties to the union include a single male and a single female.

Depending upon who lodges the 'oxymoronic objection', the list of conditions will include myriad others in addition to these. The important point is that the objectors will hold these at least. And from these, it is easy to see why such objectors regard the concept of same-sex marriage as oxymoronic. After all, a marriage is a union between a single man and a single woman, and same-sex marriage so-called is a union between a single man and a single man. Therefore, same-sex marriage can't be considered marriage in the first place. QED.

QED, that is, if you think a couple of other things - things about the nature of language that are pretty contested in philosophy (you know, the only place where this stuff matters). Most obviously, you'd have to think that "marriage" was defined as (at least) a union between one man and one woman. Okay, maybe that's not so objectionable. But to get us to the 'oxymoronic objection', you have to believe that this definition of 'marriage' cannot change. That is, for the phrase "same-sex marriage" to be considered an oxymoron, you couldn't believe only that bad things would happen if we change the definition of marriage. No, you would have to believe literally that it is not possible to change the definition; you would have to believe that there is no way to make the sentence, "Those two men are married," true.

Now, that's an objection to same-sex marriage searching for an argument - really, it's just a description of the position held by the 'oxymoronic objectors.' The objection to this description goes something like, "Yeah, but words change their meanings all the time, and lots of words have more than one meaning. Unless you're insisting that I'm unsuccessfully referring to the city of 'Davenport' when I'm not using a term that individuates a sofa, or that it's impossible for teachers to 'influence' their students without 'flowing into' their students, then you must think that the term 'marriage' has some sort of non-changing status - else we could just change it however we like, yes?"

There, I think, is the heart of the matter. When we have a concept - or a word - how do we delimit its extension? How do we change its extension? Few dispute that the concept of marriage has had "one man, one woman" as a necessary condition throughout its use historically; how, though, can such a condition actually be eliminated from the extension of the concept? It's a question worth gathering up and treasuring in our hearts.

I, for one, have been in favor of gay marriage since I wanted to grow up to be a Democrat - about 8th grade, I think. (Though, I have this lingering memory of making buttons for Bill Clinton's 1996 re-election campaign when I was about 10 years old. Mine read: "If you vote for Dole, it'll be a bore. Vote for Clinton or wait four more." I also remember a classmate who made an anti-Dole button: "His hand doesn't work!") But in the last three or four days, I've had a few philosophically-oriented that are starting to change my mind, some of which I'll share in posts forthcoming. I will say, though, that I think the deep problem here is one having to do with some of the issues I've raised in this post, issues having to do with the proper extension and delimiting of concepts, the alteration of definitions, etc. And I think it's noteworthy that our national debate on this topic has hardly involved these issues in any meaningful way.

Crazy Religion and Sane Friendship

There are two kinds of sincerely religious people: the crazy ones and the sane ones. We've all observed the former (Fred Phelps & co., Mormons, and now, those people who sold all their possessions for the rapture that's been postponed); the latter are, depending upon whom you ask, perhaps only a theoretical possibility. (If pressed, I'd say I've probably met a few. But they draw far less attention to themselves than the crazy sort do.)

What is one to make of the sincerely deluded? Well, the first thing to emphasize is that they're usually not bad people (with the probable exception of that horrible Phelps clan): they are merely carrying a (nonsensical) belief to its logical conclusion. If I truly believed God was planning to save only 144,000 special folks, why wouldn't I knock on your door to let you know about it (and, if you were out, leave some pamphlets)? The fact that it's an objectively asinine thing to do should not concern me, should it? Your salvation is at stake!

Several years ago I passed a church sign that read, "Friends don't let friends go to Hell". (Yes, it was one of those churches. On a later occasion, the sign read "Pray first, then vote". They must not've had enough letters to spell "Republican".) In all ages of the world this sentiment has been true; all ages, that is, except our present one. Only now is it widely considered a virtue to tolerate heterodoxy among one's friends. (This is assuming, of course, that one believes in an ortho-doxy to begin with.) Is this a positive development? I daresay in many ways it is. I certainly have no desire to befriend the sort of Christian — generally one of the more foaming-at-the-mouth sorts of Protestants — who would endeavor to convert me to whatever obscure non-creedal sect he belonged to.

And yet at the same time this development probably says something about our friendships. It's worth noting that the medievals had a stronger sense of friendship than we do today. The Cistercian Aelred of Rievaulx (1110-1167) considered friendship a gift from God, a point upon which even the most deracinated Episcopalian or Unitarian can probably agree. But Aelred goes further: in true friendship, as in marriage, Christ himself is present as a third person. (I would give you a full quotation, but my library, which includes Aelred's Spiritual Friendship, has gone before me into Iowa.) Is this possible in friendships between two people of different beliefs? That is to say, if friendship is such a deep spiritual connection, to what extent are friendships between people of differing beliefs the real thing? I'm not prepared to answer this question. If Aelred is right, though, I should probably be prepared to admit that I've never truly experienced "spiritual friendship", for so many of my dearest friends indeed do not share my deepest beliefs. For some reason, though, I feel no need to start proselytizing.

Facebook - What an Igneous Idea!

This might be the clincher in the argument for me to get Facebook:

Schadenfreude: FTW!

(A fu moar, f u n33d a laf r 2.)

Against the Very Model of a Modern Major PhD

(If you squint, you'll see NYU philosopher David Velleman front and center, with his trusty side-kick Hartry Field on the right. Actually, I really do imagine that department breaking into song, on occasion.)

So, I don't know how many of our readers are aware of what graduate school admissions are like these days, but if you aren't, you should know that 'brutal' and any number of its synonyms are the only adequate descriptors that come to mind. (If you do have an idea, feel free to commiserate.) Speaking strictly to Philosophy - though, I believe from anecdotal evidence that the situation is generalizable to most other humanities and fine arts disciplines - admissions rates to top-twenty programs are in the neighborhood of 3 to 7 percent. Think, for a moment, on what that means. You're willing to abandon your friends, your family, and your entire present life, devote yourself to a profession that, for at least five years, will keep you bordering on poverty, for a degree that can be called "successful" if it secures for you a solidly middle-class salary. And you're willing to do this, only if you're comfortable saying that, for any randomly selected ten to fifteen applicants, you think none would be better than you are. 'Brutal' somehow don't hardly say it.

Now, I don't want to get in to a drawn out discussion of whether this prospect is sort of something I'm looking forward to. I want to make what I think is a bit of an interesting observation about how this institution - graduate schools and PhD programs - is structured. In Philosophy, currently, New York University is more or less widely regarded as the best graduate school in the U.S. (also, the world, with Oxford University running a close second). Rutgers runs a somewhat distant second, with Princeton running a close third, Pittsburgh (ah, would that they would have me!) a close fourth, and MIT, Harvard, and Michigan rounding out what we might call 'the top handful.' [NB: There are truly excellent philosophy programs admission to which I would give my left hand that are not in this 'top handful.' This discussion is focused on the Philosophical Gourmet rankings. I'm one of quite a few people, including the administrator of the Gourmet, who think that there's only so much that this particular survey can tell us about graduate school quality.]

Now, time was, within the last twenty to forty years, that three schools in heralded unanimity comprised the pantheon of the Philosophy PhD magisterium: Harvard, Princeton, and Pittsburgh. As one pretty quickly notes, only one of these schools (Princeton) is in the top-three presently. And two schools that almost no one once thought of as among the best have (again, more or less) decisively dethroned the giants of philosophy-graduate-school-past. These are wealthy graduate programs, with the wind of historical prestige at their backs. How could they have been o'ertaken by such unlikely upstarts as NYU and Rutgers?

Well, here's a shot at an explanation. I admit, there are other candidate explanations out there, but for my part, the premises here strike me as prima facie true, and the conclusion seems to follow from them naturally. So, here goes.

Philosophy Graduate School Axioms

I. Never hire graduates of one's own program.II. The best faculty members tend to work at the best graduate programs.
III. The best graduate students tend to become the best faculty members.
IV. The best graduate students tend to acquire their degrees from the best graduate programs.

ArgumentA (1) Suppose School A has the best philosophy graduate program.
So (2) The best graduate students will tend to acquire their degrees from School A. [A1 + IV]
So (3) School A's graduate students will tend to become the best faculty members. [So2 + III]
So (4) School A will not hire the best faculty members. [So3 + I]
So (5) School A, eventually, will not be the best graduate program. [So4 + II]

The idea is simply that, if you're the best program now but you refuse to hire your own students, you'll eventually cease to have the best program, since those students you wouldn't hire will eventually become the best faculty members. Capice?

Now, if this argument is right, what sorts of hiring phenomena would you expect? Well, first, you'd expect the one I've already noted: the best graduate programs will cease to be the best graduate programs. Second, you might also expect that the 'formerly-best' institutions would have placed significantly more of their graduate students in the best philosophy jobs than the newly-best institutions. And lo, from Leiter, this is exactly what we find:

Distribution of Faculty Members from Top Philosophy Graduate Programs

New York University PhDs1. NYU: 0
2. Rutgers: 0
3. Princeton: 1
4. Pittsburgh: 1
5. Michigan: 0
6. Harvard: 0
6. MIT: 1
Total: 3

Rutgers University PhDs1. NYU: 1
2. Rutgers: 1
3. Princeton: 0
4. Pittsburgh: 0
5. Michigan: 2
6. Harvard: 0
6. MIT: 0
Total: 4

Princeton University PhDs1. NYU: 4
2. Rutgers: 4
3. Princeton: 5
4. Pittsburgh: 6
5. Michigan: 5
6. Harvard: 1
6. MIT: 5
Total: 30

University of Pittsburgh PhDs1. NYU: 0
2. Rutgers: 3
3. Princeton: 1
4. Pittsburgh: 2
5. Michigan: 2
6. Harvard: 2
6. MIT: 0
Total: 10

University of Michigan PhDs1. NYU: 0
2. Rutgers: 3
3. Princeton: 0
4. Pittsburgh: 2
5. Michigan: 3
6. Harvard: 0
6. MIT: 0
Total: 5

Harvard University PhDs1. NYU: 6
2. Rutgers: 0
3. Princeton: 4
4. Pittsburgh: 2
5. Michigan: 2
6. Harvard: 3
6. MIT: 1
Total: 18

Massachussetts Institute of Technology PhDs1. NYU: 0
2. Rutgers: 2
3. Princeton: 4
4. Pittsburgh: 0
5. Michigan: 3
6. Harvard: 4
6. MIT: 2
Total: 15

As you can see, apart from the little program that could, these results satisfy the prediction that the formerly-best programs would've outperformed the newly-best programs in terms of jobs placement.

But what's another thing you might expect? If these really are estimations of the best graduate programs producing the best students, you'd expect the above trends to begin to shift. And what might mark that shift would be, rather than the numbers of currently tenured faculty-members, an increased number of tenure-track faculty members from the newly-best programs. For while tenured faculty distributions would evidence the historical excellence among graduate programs, tenure-track faculty distributions are closer to graduate school, and so represent a more accurate rendering of the current rankings among graduate schools. And lo, the data confirms this as well. Again, from Leiter:

Distribution of Tenure-Track Faculty Members from Top Graduate Schools

1. New York University (13)2. Rutgers University, New Brunswick (8)
3. Massachussetts Institute of Technology (6)
3. Princeton University (6)
5. Yale University (3)
6. Columbia University (2)
6. Harvard University (2)

The idea here is that newly-hired faculty (untenured-but-tenure-track) are closer to the newer rankings of graduate schools. So, if a shift from the past had manifested itself in the ranking, the distribution of new hires would indicate such a shift. And, it does.

Okay, now, I admit that there are alternative theories that might explain this data. Maybe Rutgers and NYU just outspent the previously-top programs. Or (and this seems likely, to me) most of those 'tends to' in my axioms will allow for excellent philosophers to be produced by a host of programs, and since department sizes relative to the production of excellent philosophers is small-ish, and true excellence usually takes seasoning to emerge, there's plenty of room for programs by a combination of luck, smart hiring, and money to move up. Or perhaps ‘having the best faculty’ isn’t coextensive with ‘producing the best graduate students’ – though, the shift in recent hiring would need to be explained.

Anyway, the point is simply that a university’s commitment against hiring its own students seems, in addition to some pretty reasonable-sounding assumptions – to yield a recipe for the best universities eventually losing their top spots. And, if so, I suspect the recipe has been served in more disciplines than Philosophy.  Sacred Music, even?

Haggling Over the Price of the Hose

or "The Real Liquidity Trap"

I don't know whether anyone has heard, but there's supposed to be some kind of 'debate' happening amongst federal officials about how best to go about solving the U.S. 'debt crisis.' Sorry if the scare quotes identify me as an avid follower of Krugman's blog, but I am. I'm also trying to put the most charitable face on the Conservative position here as I can. To that end, try the following thought experiment.

Suppose your house is on fire. And, suppose a friend is willing to lend you water, even though you owe him quite a bit for the water you've already borrowed. Why might you shy from borrowing it now? Well, maybe you think that borrowing this water now will harm you in a time when you're in more dire need (a fire you really can't handle yourself, say), and in such a time the friend won't be willing to loan you any water, since you owe him so much as it is. So, spake the water-Conservative, thankyouverymuch, but I'll put out this particular fire on my own. I appreciate the offer, but save your water for later.

Okay, that seems sensible to me. Why borrow when you can pay for it yourself, already?

Here's my question, though. Doesn't the growth of the present fire, itself - and not necessarily the fact that you owe your friend a lot already - make your friend less likely to lend water to you in the future? That is, the growth of the present fire increases the value of the water-debt he holds on you already, since the growth of the present fire increases the risk of your defaulting on that debt (from your house burning down). Given this fact, isn't the water-Conservative's worry about future water-loans unfounded, if you can't, in fact, put out the current fire?

So, the parallels to the current debate seem pretty obvious, here. And, my suspicion is that the difference between (water) Conservatives and (water) Liberals is a disagreement about just what sort of fire it is we're fighting, and thus, just which sort of strategy will best combat it. If you're the Conservative, you think the fire is the threat of future availability of credit (after all, if we had an assurance of timelessly unlimited credit, we could borrow water like drunken sailors). If you're the Liberal, you think that the fire is joblessness and lost productivity. For my part, though, it seems like there's a sense in which fighting the Liberal's fire also fights the Conservative's fire: when you have increased employment and productivity, you generate increased tax revenues. But if what you're worried about primarily is the future availability of water, you can fight only the Conservative fight, since you can't borrow water to fight the fire of joblessness and productivity. But then, maybe you also believe in cutting in order to create jobs - tantamount to praying to the rain God, as near as I can tell.